MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
01732nam a22002657a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20240301124144.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
240301b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
International Standard Serial Number |
00222186 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Language of cataloging |
English |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Rubin, Jared |
Relator term |
author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Social insurance, commitment, and the origin of law: |
Remainder of title |
interest bans in early christianity |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Jared Rubin |
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago: |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago Press; |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2009. |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
Journal of law and economics |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 52, number 4 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
Despite the historical importance of ideology‐based, economically inhibitive laws, we know little about the economic factors underlying their origin. This paper accounts for the historical emergence of one such law: the Christian ban on taking interest—a doctrine that shaped the evolution of numerous financial contracts and related organizational forms. A game‐theoretic analysis and historical evidence suggest that the Church’s commitment to providing social insurance for its poorest constituents encouraged risky borrowing, which the Church attempted to limit by banning interest. The analysis highlights the applicability of the rational choice framework to seemingly irrational actions and laws, the role of nonmonetary sanctions in circumventing commitment problems, and the importance of economic forces vis‐à‐vis ideology |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Charity |
General subdivision |
Christian history |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Insurance providers |
General subdivision |
Social insurance |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Economic agents |
General subdivision |
Economic models |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/595796 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |