MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01525nam a22002417a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20240229125757.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
240229b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Language of cataloging |
English language |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
| 100 ## - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Gerlach, Heiko |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Self reporting, investigation and evidentiary standards |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Heiko Gerlach |
| 264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago University |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013 |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Title |
The journal of law and economics |
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 56, number 4 |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
Abstract Self-reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement. This paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort. I show that this leads to a negative relationship between self-reporting incentives and investigation effort. Three main conclusions arise. First, violators self-report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered. Second, self-reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high. Finally, authorities can increase the incentives to self-report when they convict without hard evidence. However, a hard-evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Amnesty |
| General subdivision |
Behavior deterrence |
| Geographic subdivision |
Cartels |
| 650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Marginal costs |
| General subdivision |
Optimal policy |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/674098 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |