MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
01551nam a22002777a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20240229100426.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
240229b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
International Standard Serial Number |
00222186 |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Language of cataloging |
English langauge |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
050 ## - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER |
Classification number |
HB73 JOU |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Chen, Zhijun |
Relator term |
author |
245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
On the design of leniency programs |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Zhijun Chen and Patrick Rey |
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Chicago |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
University of Chicago Press |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2013 |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
The journal of law and economics |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume , number , |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
Leniency programs contribute to destabilizing collusion but can also be abused and generate perverse effects. This paper develops a simple model capturing this trade-off, which we use to relate the optimal leniency policy (the carrot) to the effectiveness of investigations (the stick). We show that it is always desirable to offer some leniency before an investigation is launched; it is also optimal to offer some leniency once an investigation is underway when investigations are unlikely to succeed in uncovering cartels, absent self-reporting. Our analysis also confirms the usefulness of restricting leniency to the first informant only; in contrast, it does not support prohibiting leniency for repeat offenders. |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Cartel |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Leniency Program |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Antitrust |
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Rey, Patrick |
Relator term |
co author |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1086/674011 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |