MARC details
000 -LEADER |
fixed length control field |
02241nam a22002537a 4500 |
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
control field |
20231105103757.0 |
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
fixed length control field |
231105b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
Transcribing agency |
MSU |
Description conventions |
rda |
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Prencipe, Annalisa |
Relator term |
author |
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
Title |
Corporate governance and earnings management in family-controlled companies |
Statement of responsibility, etc. |
by Annalisa Prencipe and Sasson Bar-Yosef |
264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Thousand Oaks, CA: |
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Sage Publications; |
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2011. |
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
Source |
rdacontent |
Content type term |
text |
Content type code |
txt |
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
Source |
rdamedia |
Media type term |
unmediated |
Media type code |
n |
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
Source |
rdacarrier |
Carrier type term |
volume |
Carrier type code |
nc |
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
Title |
Journal Accounting, Auditing and Finance |
Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 26, number 2 |
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
Summary, etc. |
The corporate governance literature advances the idea that certain aspects of a board of directors’ structure improve the monitoring of managerial decisions. Among these decisions are a manager’s policies about managing earnings. Prior studies have shown that earnings management in widely held public companies is less prevalent when there is a high level of board independence. However, there is less evidence regarding the effectiveness of board independence on earnings management in family-controlled companies. This issue is particularly interesting as such companies are susceptible to various types of agency concerns. It is the purpose of this study to shed light on the earnings management issue in family-controlled companies characterized by potentially lower board independence and a higher risk of collusion. In this study, board independence is estimated by two parameters: (1) proportion of independent directors on the board; and (2) lack of chief executive officer (CEO)–board chairman duality function.<br/>Our empirical results provide evidence that the impact of board independence on earnings management is indeed weaker in family-controlled companies. The same result also holds for the lack of CEO– board chairman duality function. Such effects become stronger in cases in which the CEO is a member of the controlling family. |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Corporate governance |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Earnings management |
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Family-controlled companies |
700 ## - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
Personal name |
Bar-Yosef, Sasson |
Relator term |
co-author |
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X11401212 |
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
Koha item type |
Journal Article |