Midlands State University Library

Financing policy, executive stock options and cash flow forecasts/ (Record no. 162774)

MARC details
000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 02020nam a22002537a 4500
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field ZW-GwMSU
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20240424071509.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 230628b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MSU
Transcribing agency MSU
Description conventions rda
Language of cataloging English
050 00 - LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CALL NUMBER
Classification number HB1.A666 APP
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Lin, Yi - Mien
Relator term author
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Financing policy, executive stock options and cash flow forecasts/
Statement of responsibility, etc. created by Yi-Mien Lin, Woody M. Liao and Yen-Yu Liu
264 1# - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE
Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture New York:
Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer Taylor and Francis,
Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice 2013.
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Source rdacontent
Content type term text
Content type code txt
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Source rdamedia
Media type term unmediated
Media type code n
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Source rdacarrier
Carrier type term volume
Carrier type code nc
440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE
Title Applied economics letters
Volume/sequential designation Volume 20, number 3
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. This article investigates the relationship between management voluntary disclosures of cash flow forecasts and external financing policy, earnings management, earnings forecasts and executive stock option compensation. We find that management is more likely to issue cash flow forecasts when a firm has external financing needs or when a firm has more executive stock option compensation. However, management is less likely to disclose cash flow forecasts when a firm has more earnings management. Consistent with the prior research, we document that a firm with high dividend payout, large asset value and high profitability tends to disclose cash flow information to convey good news. Further, if analysts have released earning forecasts, management is likely to issue cash flow forecasts to complement those analyst earnings forecasts. If analysts release cash flow forecasts, management is less likely to disclose cash flow forecasts to avoid issuing repeat forecasts. Our results, therefore, suggest that different incentives drive management disclosure decisions regarding cash flow forecasts in actual practice.
650 ## - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM
Topical term or geographic name entry element External financing
Form subdivision Executive stock options
General subdivision Cashflow forecasts
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Liao, Woody M
Relator term co author
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Liu, Yen - Yu
Relator term co author
856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2012.689108
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Source of classification or shelving scheme Library of Congress Classification
Koha item type Journal Article
Holdings
Withdrawn status Lost status Source of classification or shelving scheme Damaged status Not for loan Home library Current library Shelving location Date acquired Serial Enumeration / chronology Total Checkouts Full call number Date last seen Copy number Koha item type Public note
    Library of Congress Classification     Main Library Main Library - Special Collections 20/01/2014 Vol. 20, no.1 (pages 213-226)   HB1.A666 APP 28/06/2023 SP17971 Journal Article For in house use only