MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
01597nam a22002537a 4500 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
ZW-GwMSU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20210413151029.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
210413b ||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 022 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER |
|---|
| International Standard Serial Number |
0148-558X |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
|---|
| Original cataloging agency |
MSU |
| Transcribing agency |
MSU |
| Description conventions |
rda |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Bertomeu, Jeremy |
| Relator term |
author |
| 245 ## - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
Economic consequences of equity compensation disclosure/ |
| Statement of responsibility, etc. |
Jeremy Bertomeu |
| 264 ## - PRODUCTION, PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, MANUFACTURE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE |
|---|
| Place of production, publication, distribution, manufacture |
Thousand Oaks, Califonia: |
| Name of producer, publisher, distributor, manufacturer |
Sage, |
| Date of production, publication, distribution, manufacture, or copyright notice |
2012. |
| 336 ## - CONTENT TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacontent |
| Content type term |
text |
| Content type code |
txt |
| 337 ## - MEDIA TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdamedia |
| Media type term |
unmediated |
| Media type code |
n |
| 338 ## - CARRIER TYPE |
|---|
| Source |
rdacarrier |
| Carrier type term |
volume |
| Carrier type code |
nc |
| 440 ## - SERIES STATEMENT/ADDED ENTRY--TITLE |
|---|
| Title |
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance |
| Volume/sequential designation |
Volume 27 , number 4 , |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
The primary role of equity compensation is to provide incentives to an effort-averse agent. Here, the author shows that the chosen level of equity incentives, when publicly disclosed, will also convey information about future earnings, causing two-way linkages between incentive compensation, and financial reporting. If (a) market prices respond more (less) to information, (b) the manager is more (less) risk averse, or (c) earnings are more (less) noisy, then the firm’s owners choose more pronounced (muted) incentives, in turn leading to greater (lower) future earnings. The model explains observed spurious correlations between firm performance and executive compensation, and it provides several new predictions linking managerial, earnings, and market determinants to optimal equity holdings. |
| 650 4# - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Executive compensation |
| 650 4# - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Disclosure |
| 650 4# - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name entry element |
Incentives |
| 856 ## - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0148558X11409161 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Library of Congress Classification |
| Koha item type |
Journal Article |