Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations?: An empirical analysis
Moore, Michael
Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations?: An empirical analysis created by Michael O. Moore and Alan K. Fox - Review of World Economics Volume 145, number 1 .
Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US faced “facts available” margins for the 1995–2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who did not cooperate. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.
16102878
Antidumping--US trade policy--United States--Facts-available
HF1351 REV
Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations?: An empirical analysis created by Michael O. Moore and Alan K. Fox - Review of World Economics Volume 145, number 1 .
Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US faced “facts available” margins for the 1995–2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who did not cooperate. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.
16102878
Antidumping--US trade policy--United States--Facts-available
HF1351 REV