Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
Moreno, Diego
Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods created by Diego Moreno and María José Moscoso - Economic theory Volume 52, number 1 .
We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial—i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.
09382259
Allocation mechanisms--Strategy-proofness--Public goods
Dictatorship--Efficiency
HB119 ECO
Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods created by Diego Moreno and María José Moscoso - Economic theory Volume 52, number 1 .
We show that strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods are dictatorial—i.e., they always select an allocation in their range that maximizes the welfare of the same single individual (the dictator). Further, strategy-proof and efficient allocation mechanisms are strongly dictatorial—i.e., they select the dictator's preferred allocation on the entire feasible set. Thus, our results reveal the extent to which the conflict between individual incentives and other properties that may be deemed desirable (e.g., fairness, equal treatment, distributive justice) pervades resource allocation problems.
09382259
Allocation mechanisms--Strategy-proofness--Public goods
Dictatorship--Efficiency
HB119 ECO