Midlands State University Library

Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities

Anno, Hidekazu

Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities by Hidekazu Anno and Hiroo Sasaki - Economic theory Volume 54, number 3 .

We study strategy-proof allocation rules in economies with perfectly divisible multiple commodities and single-peaked preferences. In this setup, it is known that the incompatibility among strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and non-dictatorship arises in contrast with the Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519, 1991) one commodity model. We first investigate the existence problem of strategy-proof and second-best efficient rules, where a strategy-proof rule is second-best efficient if it is not Pareto-dominated by any other strategy-proof rules. We show that there exists an egalitarian rational (consequently, non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rule satisfying second-best efficiency. Second, we give a new characterization of the generalized uniform rule with the second-best efficiency in two-agent case.

0938-2259


Allocation rules--Multiple commodities--Strategy-proofness

HB119 ECO