Production externalities: internalization by voting
Crès, Hervé
Production externalities: internalization by voting by Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede - Economic theory Volume 53, number 2 .
We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance
Business and Economics--Economic Theory
HB119 ECO
Production externalities: internalization by voting by Hervé Crès, Mich Tvede - Economic theory Volume 53, number 2 .
We study internalization of production externalities in perfectly competitive markets where production plans are decided by majority voting. Since shareholders want firms to maximize dividends of portfolios rather than profits, they are interested in some internalization. Two governances, namely the shareholder governance (one share, one vote) and the stakeholder democracy (one stakeholder, one vote), are compared. We argue that perfect internalization is more likely to be the outcome of the stakeholder democracy than the shareholder governance
Business and Economics--Economic Theory
HB119 ECO