Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry
Schneider, Henry
Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry created by Henry Schneider - Journal of Law and Economics Volume 53, number 4 .
In this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees’ accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis of the cross section of all drivers and a panel-data analysis of a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning
00222186
Accident rates--Automobile accidents--Accidents
Estimated taxes--Moral hazard--Leases
Taxi drivers--Vehicle operation--Traffic violations
HB73 JOU
Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry created by Henry Schneider - Journal of Law and Economics Volume 53, number 4 .
In this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees’ accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis of the cross section of all drivers and a panel-data analysis of a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning
00222186
Accident rates--Automobile accidents--Accidents
Estimated taxes--Moral hazard--Leases
Taxi drivers--Vehicle operation--Traffic violations
HB73 JOU