Law firm expertise and merger and acquisition outcomes
Krishnan, C. N. V.
Law firm expertise and merger and acquisition outcomes created by C. N. V. Krishnan and Ronald W. Masulis - Journal of Law and Economics Volume 56, number 1 .
Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. mergers and acquisitions (M&A) bids over 1990-2008, we document that top-market-share law firms are associated with a number of important bid outcomes and characteristics. Top bidder law firms are associated with significantly higher offer completion rates. In contrast, top target law firms are associated with significantly higher offer withdrawal rates. Top bidder and target law firms are both associated with significantly higher takeover premia. These associations are significant even after controlling for selection bias and major offer, bidder, and investment bank adviser characteristics. Our interpretation is that top bidder law firms have stronger incentives and abilities to facilitate deal completions, while top target law firms have stronger incentives and abilities to help realize higher takeover premia, consistent with their clients’ objectives. Our findings suggest that law firm market share is an important omitted variable in current economic models of M&A deal outcomes
00222186
Banking industry--Financial services industries--Financial advisers
Industrial concentration--Law firms--Investment banking
Linear regression--Market share--Litigation
HB73 JOU
Law firm expertise and merger and acquisition outcomes created by C. N. V. Krishnan and Ronald W. Masulis - Journal of Law and Economics Volume 56, number 1 .
Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. mergers and acquisitions (M&A) bids over 1990-2008, we document that top-market-share law firms are associated with a number of important bid outcomes and characteristics. Top bidder law firms are associated with significantly higher offer completion rates. In contrast, top target law firms are associated with significantly higher offer withdrawal rates. Top bidder and target law firms are both associated with significantly higher takeover premia. These associations are significant even after controlling for selection bias and major offer, bidder, and investment bank adviser characteristics. Our interpretation is that top bidder law firms have stronger incentives and abilities to facilitate deal completions, while top target law firms have stronger incentives and abilities to help realize higher takeover premia, consistent with their clients’ objectives. Our findings suggest that law firm market share is an important omitted variable in current economic models of M&A deal outcomes
00222186
Banking industry--Financial services industries--Financial advisers
Industrial concentration--Law firms--Investment banking
Linear regression--Market share--Litigation
HB73 JOU