Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game
Pecorino, Paul
Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game by Paul Pecorino and Mark Van Boening - The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 53, number 2 .
We embed an ultimatum game in a stylized legal bargaining framework. This changes the framing of the standard ultimatum game in several ways but also moves the bargaining closer to what is found in some naturally occurring settings. In this context, the ultimatum game is played over the joint surplus, which is achieved from settlement rather than a dispute. In our embedded ultimatum game, the median offer contains only 8 percent of the joint surplus from settlement. When we replicate the simple ultimatum game, we find that 50 percent of the joint surplus is contained in the median offer
00222186
Central tendencies--Fairness--Defendants
Null hypothesis--Risk aversion--Plaintiffs
Statistical median--Trials--Surplus
HB73 JOU
Fairness in an Embedded Ultimatum Game by Paul Pecorino and Mark Van Boening - The Journal of Law and Economics Volume 53, number 2 .
We embed an ultimatum game in a stylized legal bargaining framework. This changes the framing of the standard ultimatum game in several ways but also moves the bargaining closer to what is found in some naturally occurring settings. In this context, the ultimatum game is played over the joint surplus, which is achieved from settlement rather than a dispute. In our embedded ultimatum game, the median offer contains only 8 percent of the joint surplus from settlement. When we replicate the simple ultimatum game, we find that 50 percent of the joint surplus is contained in the median offer
00222186
Central tendencies--Fairness--Defendants
Null hypothesis--Risk aversion--Plaintiffs
Statistical median--Trials--Surplus
HB73 JOU