Is antitrust too complicated for generalist judges: the impact of economic complexity and judicial training on appeals
Baye,Michael R.
Is antitrust too complicated for generalist judges: the impact of economic complexity and judicial training on appeals by Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright - Journal of law and economics Volume 54, number 1 .
he joint presence of technological change and consumption externalities is central to health care industries around the world, because medical innovation drives the expansion of the health care sector and altruism seems to motivate many public subsidies. Although traditional economic analysis has proposed well-known remedies to deal with consumption externalities and inefficient technological change in isolation, it lacks clear principles for addressing them jointly. We argue that standard remedies to each of the two problems are inadequate. Focusing on U.S. health care, we provide illustrative calculations of the dynamic inefficiency in the level of research and development (R&D) spending when innovators are unable to appropriate the altruistic surplus of non consumers. We calibrate that altruistic gains amount to about a quarter of consumer surplus in the baseline scenario and that R&D spending may be underprovided by as much as 60 percent
00222186
Antitrust--Daubert
Complexity--Economic training
Expert witness
HB73 JOU
Is antitrust too complicated for generalist judges: the impact of economic complexity and judicial training on appeals by Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright - Journal of law and economics Volume 54, number 1 .
he joint presence of technological change and consumption externalities is central to health care industries around the world, because medical innovation drives the expansion of the health care sector and altruism seems to motivate many public subsidies. Although traditional economic analysis has proposed well-known remedies to deal with consumption externalities and inefficient technological change in isolation, it lacks clear principles for addressing them jointly. We argue that standard remedies to each of the two problems are inadequate. Focusing on U.S. health care, we provide illustrative calculations of the dynamic inefficiency in the level of research and development (R&D) spending when innovators are unable to appropriate the altruistic surplus of non consumers. We calibrate that altruistic gains amount to about a quarter of consumer surplus in the baseline scenario and that R&D spending may be underprovided by as much as 60 percent
00222186
Antitrust--Daubert
Complexity--Economic training
Expert witness
HB73 JOU