Redistricting and polarization: who draws the lines in California?
Grainger, Corbett A.
Redistricting and polarization: who draws the lines in California? by Corbett A. Grainger - Journal of law and economics Volume 53, number 3 .
In the United States, the process of drawing election districts is left to individual states, and critics of legislative redistricting often argue for independent panels to take control of the process. A common claim is that legislative redistricting has been a major contributor to polarization in the American political system. Previous attempts to test for a relationship between redistricting and polarization have generally relied on cross-state comparisons of redistricting methods and examinations of behavior in the House of Representatives. In this paper, I exploit the alternation between legislatively drawn and panel-drawn districts in California since the mid-1960s. Using data at the state legislature level, I find evidence that legislatively drawn districts have been, on average, less competitive than panel-drawn districts. Moreover, as districts become “safer,” legislators tend to take more extreme voting positions. Finally, I find evidence that legislative redistricting (compared with panel-drawn redistricting) is associated with increased polarization
00222186
Electoral districts--Governors--United States
Labor legislation--Legislative districts--United States
Political parties--Redistricting--United States
HB73 JOU
Redistricting and polarization: who draws the lines in California? by Corbett A. Grainger - Journal of law and economics Volume 53, number 3 .
In the United States, the process of drawing election districts is left to individual states, and critics of legislative redistricting often argue for independent panels to take control of the process. A common claim is that legislative redistricting has been a major contributor to polarization in the American political system. Previous attempts to test for a relationship between redistricting and polarization have generally relied on cross-state comparisons of redistricting methods and examinations of behavior in the House of Representatives. In this paper, I exploit the alternation between legislatively drawn and panel-drawn districts in California since the mid-1960s. Using data at the state legislature level, I find evidence that legislatively drawn districts have been, on average, less competitive than panel-drawn districts. Moreover, as districts become “safer,” legislators tend to take more extreme voting positions. Finally, I find evidence that legislative redistricting (compared with panel-drawn redistricting) is associated with increased polarization
00222186
Electoral districts--Governors--United States
Labor legislation--Legislative districts--United States
Political parties--Redistricting--United States
HB73 JOU