Self reporting, investigation and evidentiary standards
Gerlach, Heiko
Self reporting, investigation and evidentiary standards by Heiko Gerlach - The journal of law and economics Volume 56, number 4 .
Abstract Self-reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement. This paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort. I show that this leads to a negative relationship between self-reporting incentives and investigation effort. Three main conclusions arise. First, violators self-report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered. Second, self-reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high. Finally, authorities can increase the incentives to self-report when they convict without hard evidence. However, a hard-evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior
Amnesty--Behavior deterrence--Cartels
Marginal costs--Optimal policy
HB73 JOU
Self reporting, investigation and evidentiary standards by Heiko Gerlach - The journal of law and economics Volume 56, number 4 .
Abstract Self-reporting schemes have become a substantial part of law enforcement. This paper analyzes the optimal use of such schemes when the authority cannot commit to an ex post investigation effort. I show that this leads to a negative relationship between self-reporting incentives and investigation effort. Three main conclusions arise. First, violators self-report with a probability of 1 if and only if full amnesty is offered. Second, self-reporting schemes are not efficient when the level of harm of the act is high. Finally, authorities can increase the incentives to self-report when they convict without hard evidence. However, a hard-evidence standard provides more deterrence and is weakly welfare superior
Amnesty--Behavior deterrence--Cartels
Marginal costs--Optimal policy
HB73 JOU