Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms?
Bos Iwan
Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms? created by Iwan Bos , Ronald Peeters and Erik Pot - Applied economics letters Volume 20, number 5 .
This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.
13504851
Tacit collusion--Antitrust enforcement--Explicit collusion
HB1.A666 APP
Do antitrust agencies facilitate meetings in smoke-filled rooms? created by Iwan Bos , Ronald Peeters and Erik Pot - Applied economics letters Volume 20, number 5 .
This article identifies a potential adverse effect of antitrust enforcement. We show that if tacit collusion is not sustainable, firms are able and willing to collude explicitly when demand is viscous, the expected antitrust penalty is limited and antitrust agencies are sufficiently effective in catching cartels.
13504851
Tacit collusion--Antitrust enforcement--Explicit collusion
HB1.A666 APP